DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
CORRECTED COPY

Mr. Kearney

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FROM: US CINCEUR PARIS FR

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

DATE ....

TO : CJCS WASH DC

INFO: CINCUSAFE ADVON RAMSTEIN GERMANY

NR : EC 9-3715   111440Z JUL 59

/EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL TWINING FROM GENERAL NORSTAD/

Ref A. Proposed JCS message given to Col L G Cagwin, SHAPE,
by Col Doyle, SHAPE LN O, 10 Jun 59.

B. Tripartite paper "Berlin Contingency Planning," dtd 4
Apr 59 (SM 66-59, 7 Apr 59).

C. AMEMB Bonn dispatch 1742 to Dept of State dtd 27 May 59.

1. My views, including Live Oak consideration, were
requested by Reference A on possible Soviet withdrawal from the
Berlin Air Safety Center (Par 12(b)(1), Ref B).

2. In brief, the Live Oak staff considers that the selection
of the best course of action is political in nature, but that the
calculated risk involved in any of the proposed courses of action
is militarily acceptable.

3. While I agree generally with the Live Oak views, I
believe that course of action number 1 should only be considered as
a last resort. Under these circumstances, civil air carrier air-
craft participation is doubtful and separation based on evasive
action by Air Traffic Controller could eventually have tragic results,
despite quality of radar employed. Course of action number II is
best possible under the circumstances posed. Rather than attempt to
notify the Deutsche Lufthansa (East) to pass Allied corridor traffic,
I recommend that coincidental with Soviet withdrawal from BASC, the
tripartite statement proposed in Reference C (discussion of course of
action number II) be modified to the extent that "Flight plans will
be transmitted to the appropriate teletype addressee the Soviets will

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designate, etc." This approach further removes necessity for
German Democratic Republic contact and puts the DDR on notice
that safety of flight information is available.

    4. Based on this, I believe course of action number II
should read: "To refuse to accept an East German Controller but
attempt to notify the East German authorities, through a Soviet
communication medium, of Western flights so that the East German
authorities can effectively provide flight separation." If the
Soviets refuse to designate an appropriate teletype addressee, I
still favor course of action number II over course of action
number I, providing we also continue to inform the Soviets of
Allied traffic operating in the Berlin air corridors and control
zone by placing flight plans on the Soviet Controller's desk in
Basc.

    5. Consideration should also be given to the open radio
broadcasting of flight plans, repetitiously, on a previously
announced and easily available frequency. These broadcasts could
be in lieu of, or in addition to, the communications recommended
in course of action II. Flight plans should continue to be
placed on the Soviet Controller's desk in Basc and a tape record-
ing of broadcasts maintained for record purposed. More importantly,
the broadcasts would be immediately available to the world at
large, thus putting the onus on the Soviets for any accidents which
might occur.

    6. Information copies of this message are being furnished
separately to the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of
Staff of National Defense, France, and the United States Ambaddador
at Bonn.

NOTE : Corrected copy. Corrected portion underlined.
    : Advance copy delivered to JCS.
    1742 is not identified in SMD.

ACTION: CJCS

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